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arrangements on micro-credit groups’ repayment 
performance have rarely been studied. Data on 3,350 
expired group loans in 300 Indian villages highlight 
that regular monitoring and audits, high repayment 
frequency, consumption smoothing support through 
rice credit, and having group savings deposited with 
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the lender all significantly increase repayment rates. 
Estimated magnitudes of their effects vastly exceed 
those of members’ socio-economic characteristics. 
Significantly lower repayment on loans originating 
in externally provided grant resources suggests that 
stringent monitoring will be essential for these to have a 
sustainable impact.  
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1. Introduction   
The past 30 years have witnessed a veritable boom of micro-finance. As of the end of 2006, 3,316 micro-
credit institutions reported reaching more than 133 million clients, about 92.9 million of whom were, at 
the point of taking their first loan, among the poorest (Daley-Harris 2007). The reason for such expansion 
is believed to lie in the ability of such groups to mitigate the challenges of moral hazard and adverse 
selection by applying peer monitoring and pressure that are less costly than those available to formal 
institutions (Stiglitz 1990, Banerjee et al. 1994, Besley and Coate 1995, Conning and Udry 2005). 
However, there is considerable debate about whether such groups will do so sustainably by ensuring that 
even poor borrowers will pay back their loans. While factors affecting repayment performance would thus 
be of great policy relevance, results in the literature vary widely (Zeller 1998, Ahlin and Townsend 2007, 
Cull et al. 2007), and few studies have explored cross-group variation in management practices as a factor 
that could affect this outcome variable.  
We examine whether and how much repayment is affected by loan source, groups’ provision of 
public goods in the form of insurance substitutes, and exogenously imposed management practices. The 
data used are from more than 2,000 groups, federated in 299 village organizations (VOs) in a program to 
deliver micro-credit to poor rural women in the Indian State of Andhra Pradesh. The fact that each VO’s 
management practices vary considerably but are not a choice variable for groups who joined the program 
after the VO had come into existence provides a source of exogenous variation. Section two describes the 
program and data. Section three describes the model and estimation method. Section four reports results 
and section five concludes.  
2. Program Description and Data 
The program under study builds on a tradition of women self-help groups (SHGs) which consist of 10-15 
members who meet regularly to discuss social issues and activities, deposit a small thrift payment into a 
joint account, and make decisions on loans. The program aims to trigger SHG-formation by non-
participant households and federation of all SHGs in a village into Village Organizations (VOs) to help 
obtain loans from commercial banks and provide public goods.  
In contrast to the literature that mostly looks at individual loan repayment, we focus on SHG loans. 
Funds for these can come from three sources, namely commercial bank loans via the VO, internal savings 
by participating SHGs, or grants provided to the VO under a “community investment fund” (CIF). Our 
  2data cover 3,350 “expired” loans past their original due date by 2,147 SHGs in 299 VOs. They started in 
2003 after the majority of VOs were formed and coincide with a major drive for SHG formation up to 
2006.  
Table 1 illustrates that of the 40 million rupees (about 1 million USD) transferred through these loans, 
about 60% emanated from CIF resources. With only 63% fully repaid (and 23% of the amount still 
outstanding), repayment is lower for these compared to bank (87%) and internal (89%) loans.  The 
variables at SHG and loan levels that might affect repayment rates as summarized in table 2 include size, 
source, length, and interest rate of the loan and a dummy for high (monthly or less) repayment frequency 
and the SHG’s size, age, and membership composition.  
The rules governing monitoring and loan recovery, the main subject of this study, are VO-specific 
and were determined by SHGs in existence at the time of VO formation. SHGs formed thereafter adopted 
the rules of the VO in their village by default, providing us with a source of exogenous variation. Rules 
differ in four key dimensions, namely (i) the modalities for SHGs to obtain and repay loans; (ii) VOs’ 
monitoring of financial affairs by member SHGs; (iii) the extent to which the VO provides public goods; 
and (iv) SHGs being required to make regular thrift payments that are deposited with the VO.  
Repayment modalities include existence of a “loan recovery” committee to monitor SHGs’ credit 
worthiness (e.g., through rating) and whether fees need to be paid by SHGs who miss an installment. We 
would expect both to increase repayment probability. VOs’ monitoring of SHGs’ financial affairs is 
proxied by three variables, namely whether the VO (i) regularly inspects member SHGs’ books at 
monthly meetings; (ii) employs a trained book keeper; and (iii) regularly audits members' books. Again, 
all of these should help to reduce defaults. VOs’ provision of non-financial services to raise members’ 
economic potential is proxied by two dummies indicating whether in-kind consumption credit and 
marketing services are provided. As such benefits can be cut off in case of default they should enhance 
repayment incentives, especially insofar as alternative sources for the associated benefits are unavailable. 
VOs’ collection of thrift from member SHGs provides a cash collateral that can be withheld in case of 
default and thus should increase repayment incentives as well.  
Summary statistics for these variables reported in table 3 suggest that 36% of the VOs in the sample 
applied a sanction for SHGs who miss an installment, 41% had a loan recovery committee, 35% provided 
in-kind consumption credit, 25% provided marketing services, 47% collected thrift from their member 
SHGs, 82% employed trained book keepers, 37% of the SHGs in the sample were regularly audited, and 
23% presented books at VO meetings. 
 
  33. Model and Estimation Method 
We use a novel tobit model with random VO and group effects to account for unobservables at both 
levels. Indexing VOs, SHGs, and loans by i,  k, and h, respectively and letting  X  be a vector of 
explanatory variables that include monitoring and repayment rules as well as loan and SHG 
characteristics and denoting our dependent variable, the percentage of the amount of expired loans 
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To estimate this model, we use simulated partial maximum likelihood estimation in three steps: 
(1) draw  v R  random numbers from the standard normal distribution, and denote the random draws 
by 
v r
i a ,   v , , 1    for each VO;   v R  r
(2) draw  u R  random numbers from the standard normal distribution, and denote the random draws 
by 
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ik b ,   u , , 1   for each SHG;  u R  r
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4. Estimation Results 
Tobit regression results (with   and   both equal to 80) and average partial effects evaluated at 
sample means of explanatory variables on the probability of full repayment    and the share 
overdue    are reported in table 4. As noted earlier, VO-level rules were chosen by existing 
SHGs at the time of VO formation whereas SHGs formed thereafter had to accept existing rules. Because 
inclusion of SHGs who, at the time of VO formation, participated in framing the rules  could violate 
orthogonality between rules and unobserved SHG characteristics, we focus on the restricted sample that 
only includes SHGs who joined the program thereafter (col. 1-4), while noting that coefficients’ signs, 
and in most cases significance levels, are similar between the two samples.  
v R u R
) | 0 ( X y P 
) | ( X y E
Monitoring and loan recovery arrangements are highly significant both statistically and economically. 
Regular audits, checking of SHG-books at VO meetings, and having savings deposited with the VO are 
estimated to increase full repayment probabilities by 8.3, 9.5, and 20 points. This is in line with evidence 
on the impact of access to information (Luoto et al. 2007). While VOs’ marketing involvement has no 
impact, in-kind consumption credit is predicted to increase probability of full payment by 12.7 points, 
consistent with other studies suggesting that non-economic benefits from credit groups, access to which 
could be lost through default, increase repayment incentives (Godquin 2004). It also implies that VOs are 
better positioned to help smooth consumption and address credit market imperfections than to intervene in 
output markets.  
The highly significant and negative coefficient on a bank source dummy suggests that loans from 
banks are, by 18.6 points according to the estimate, more likely to be fully repaid, with a significant, 
though slightly smaller, effect of internal lending in the large sample. This lower repayment on loans 
made from groups’ own capital (including resource made available to them through an externally funded 
project) points to limits in VOs’ credibility, possibly due to their relatively recent establishment. High 
installment frequency has an almost equally large effect (15 points), consistent with the notion that, with 
credit constraints, frequent small installments enhance repayment performance. Consistent with other 
studies, full repayment is less likely for loans with longer duration and (less significantly) higher interest.  
  5Compared to mixed evidence on the impact of group characteristics in the literature (Armendariz de 
Aghion 1999, Guttman 2006), our results suggest that repayment probability increases up to a size of 
about 14 members and decreases thereafter, and decreases with group age up to about five years. 
Although the positive significant coefficient on the share of very poor members (and a marginally 
significant one for poor members) point to lower rates of full repayment in groups with poor individuals, 
the magnitude is small: a 10 point increase in very poor members’ share would reduce full repayment by 
1.7 points only, suggesting that there is much less of a trade-off between sustainability and serving the 
poorest than would be suggested by cross-country studies (Cull et al. 2007). Neither caste-composition 
nor homogeneity has a significant impact. Overall, the overriding importance of rules and management 
practices emerging from our data suggests that, in the context at hand, even groups comprised of very 
poor borrowers in high risk conditions can achieve high repayment rates if proper rules and management 
practices are adopted.  
5. Conclusion 
In contrast to most existing literature that studies the impact of group and individual attributes on loan 
repayment in micro-credit groups, we investigate the impacts of exogenous monitoring and loan recovery 
arrangements, together with loan and group characteristics. As banks and others can provide micro-
finance institutions with additional resources contingent on adoption of certain minimum rules, this could 
be of great practical relevance. Our results highlight the overriding importance of rules, suggesting that 
the impact of regular monitoring, audits, and high repayment frequencies as well as in-kind credit to 
ensure consumption can more than compensate not only for loans made out of grants rather than bank 
loans but, more importantly, for the decrease in repayment probability incurred by focusing on groups of 
very poor borrowers.  
 
  6Table 1. Loan characteristics in the sample  
Source of loans  Bank  CIF  Internal Mixed 
Number of loans   255  1086  457  349 
Amount of loans (Rs million)   8.28  23.72  3.12  4.87 
Full repayment   0.87  0.63  0.89  0.81 
% overdue  0.08  0.23  0.08  0.12 
Interest rate   12.5  13.2  14.8  13.4 
Number of SHGs  2147 
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Table 2. Summary statistics of explanatory variables at loan and SHG levels 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev. 
Loan level     
Loan size (1,000Rs)  15.8  24.1 
Source is bank  0.28  0.45 
Source is internal lending  0.19  0.39 
From CIF  0.44  0.50 
Source is mix  0.10  0.30 
Annual interest rate (%)  14  4 
Length of loan (year)  0.90  0.43 
Installment weekly or fortnightly   0.74  0.44 
No. of observations (loans)  3,350 
SHG level   
SHG size (number of members)  13.1  2.4 
SHG age (years)  5.30  2.39 
Share of very poor members (%)  0.34  0.32 
Share of poor members (%)  0.39  0.28 
Share of members belong to Scheduled 
Caste/Tribe (%)  0.33  0.38 
Share of members in other backward castes (%)  0.54  0.44 
Share of members from dominant caste (%)  0.91  0.16 
No. of observations (groups)  2,147 
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Table 3. Village Organizations’ management practices 
Variable Mean Std.  Dev. 
If fine paid by SHGs who miss an installment  0.36 0.48 
If loan recovery committee existed  0.41  0.49 
If VO provided in-kind consumption credit   0.35  0.48 
If VO provided marketing services  0.25  0.43 
If VO collected thrift from SHGs  0.47  0.50 
If VO employed a trained book keeper  0.82  0.38 
If SHG audited by VO*  0.37  0.48 
If SHG required to present the books at VO*  0.23  0.42 
* The two variables are at SHG level. Table 4. Tobit regression results 
  SHGs who joined after VO formation  All SHGs 









Loan characteristics                   
Amount (1,000Rs)  0.000  (0.001)    0.000  0.000  0.003  -0.001  ***  -0.001  0.001 
From  bank  -0.683  (0.136)  *** 0.186  -0.251 -0.688  -0.096  *** 0.156  -0.209 
From internal lending  0.025  (0.102)    -0.009  0.012  -0.218  -0.073  ***  0.062  -0.083 
From  mixed  fund  -0.165  (0.107)   0.057 -0.078  -0.037  -0.07   0.011 -0.015 
Interest rate p.a. (%)  0.024  (0.011)  **  -0.009  0.006  0.009  -0.007    -0.003  0.002 
Length  (years)  0.409  (0.084)  *** -0.149  0.111  0.489  -0.059  *** -0.145  0.121 
Installments at least monthly   -0.332  (0.095)  *** 0.129  -0.176 -0.465  -0.065  *** 0.151  -0.201 
Borrower characteristics                  
SHG size  -0.245  (0.072)  ***  0.089  -0.066  -0.057  -0.048    0.017  -0.014 
SHG size squared  0.009  (0.003)  ***      0.002  -0.002       
SHG age   0.186  (0.079)  **  -0.068  0.050  -0.018  -0.036    0.005  -0.004 
SHG age squared  -0.020  (0.007)  ***      0  -0.003       
Share of very poor members (%)  0.461  (0.161)  ***  -0.167  0.125  0.351  -0.114  ***  -0.105  0.087 
Share of poor members (%)  0.288  (0.169)  *  -0.104  0.078  0.012  -0.117    -0.003  0.003 
Share of scheduled caste/tribe members (%)  0.219  (0.179)   -0.080  0.059  0.317  -0.109  *** -0.094  0.079 
Share of other backward caste members (%)  0.265  (0.175)    -0.096  0.072  0.214  -0.106  **  -0.064  0.053 
Share of members from dominant caste (%)  -0.285  (0.238)    0.104  -0.077  -0.391  -0.17  **  0.116  -0.097 
VO’s Management practices                   
SHG regularly audited   -0.233  (0.091)  **  0.083  -0.113  -0.078  -0.058    0.023  -0.031 
SHG required to present books at VO meeting  -0.275  (0.094)  *** 0.095  -0.128 -0.191  -0.067  *** 0.054  -0.073 
fees for missing installment  -0.088  (0.084)    0.032  -0.043  -0.199  -0.057  ***  0.059  -0.079 
loan recovery committee existed  -0.062  (0.077)   0.023  -0.031 -0.102  -0.051  **  0.03  -0.04 
VO collected thrift from SHGs  -0.541  (0.087)  ***  0.200  -0.272  -0.429  -0.058  ***  0.133  -0.178 
VO employed trained book keeper  -0.149  (0.097)    0.056  -0.077  -0.166  -0.067  **  0.052  -0.07 
VO provided in-kind consumption credit    -0.371  (0.092)  *** 0.127  -0.173 -0.353  -0.06  *** 0.102  -0.137 
VO provided marketing services  0.003  (0.084)    -0.001  0.002  0  -0.055    0  0 
Other parameters                  
Constant 0.861  (0.424)  **      0.342  -0.311       
σν (VO random effect)  0.010  (0.278)        0.525  -0.126  ***     
σu (SHG random effect)  0.768  (0.053)  ***      0.267  -0.268       
σε (random error term)  0.306  (0.089)  ***      0.756  -0.134  ***     
Number of observations  1,120      3,350     
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